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Introduction 
n recent years there has been an explosion of agricultural animal welfare standards.  The rise 
of animal welfare standards has coincided with an increase in all types of standards (e.g. 
food safety, food quality, environmental standards) in the agrifood system.  The emphasis on 
standards has occurred as regulation of agrifood systems has shifted.  Whereas nation-states 
used to be the primary regulators of agrifood systems, the new agrifood terrain now includes, 
not only nation-states, but also global governance organizations, (e.g., World Trade 
Organization, WTO), multilateral and regional regulatory schemes, (e.g., the European Union, 
EU), and private sector organizations, including transnational corporations (e.g., Cargill and 
Wal-Mart) (McMichael 2004; Higgins and Lawrence 2005; and Scholte 2000).   
As the organization of agrifood systems has shifted, standards1 have become one of the 
most significant emerging practices for governing food (Bain, Deaton, and Busch 2005; 
Higgins and Lawrence 2005).   Economists have typically highlighted the role standards play in 
helping to reduce transaction costs, increasing the predictability of a product, and in general, 
simplifying what could be a very tedious and complicated process.  With the increasing 
importance of standards, however, a shift has occurred from the use of standards as technical 
tools for market homogeneity to the use of standards as strategic tools for accessing markets, 
coordinating systems, enhancing quality and safety assurance, product branding, and creating 
niche markets (Giovannucci and Reardon 2000; Reardon et al. 2001).   
As global agriculture restructuring has occurred and the importance of standards have 
been recognized, scholars have raised concerns surrounding the distributional benefits of 
standards, especially for developing countries, small scale producers (in developed and 
developing countries), and farmers utilizing alternative production systems (Bain et al. 2005; 
Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Dunn 2003; Freidberg 2004; Reardon and Farina 2002; Unnevehr 
and Roberts 2004).  In particular, this growing body of research has highlighted the following: 
the rise of different types of standards, the lack of opportunity for specific groups to participate 
in standard setting, the high costs associated with standards adoption, and the elevation of 
standards that require adherence to specific forms of production and processing in agrifood 
systems.  Much of this later work on standards has come out of a political economic tradition, 
and this literature has provided empirical evidence regarding the disproportionate distributional 
benefits emanating from standards and the role that powerful actors have in setting standards 
(Bingen and Busch 2006; Busch et al. 2005; Freidberg 2004).  However, still absent is an 
organizational analysis of agrifood standards and the role that institutions play in shaping 
agrifood standards.  This article incorporates sociological neo-institutionalism in an effort to 
                                                
* Department of Sociology & Anthropology, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, 23173. Many thanks go to 
Matthew Kleiman, Wynne Wright, and Jeff Hass. 
1 “Standards are documented criteria or specifications, used as rules, guidelines or definitions of characteristics, to 
ensure consistency and compatibility in materials, products, and services.  In use, standards become measures by 
which products, processes and producers are judged” (Bain et al. 2005, 81).  Standards for animal agriculture tend 
to focus either on food safety or product attributes, which generally encompass quality concerns like meat 
tenderness or animal welfare issues (Ransom 2006). 
I 
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provide a more nuanced understanding of the current political economic theorizing about 
agrifood standards.  Specifically, neo-institutionalism provides a new theoretical lens to help 
explain the recent growth in agricultural animal welfare standards that allows for the 
recognition of the role that institutions, not solely individual actors, play in shaping the creation 
and adoption of standards.   
Historically, standards in most national food sectors have focused on what are called 
product (or performance) standards, that is the composition (e.g., shape, color, etc.) of the final 
product and/or health features of the product (e.g. pesticide residues, contaminants, etc.), all of 
which are easily measured in the end product (Hannin, Codron, and Thoyer 2006).  In much of 
the recent standards literature, the explanation for the emergence of food safety (or product) 
standards has to do with the decline of nation-state regulation combined with the many well-
publicized food safety scares that have occurred in various countries (e.g., BSE - bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy, E-Coli contaminated meats and vegetables, and dioxin-
contaminated chicken).  Thus, in order to reassure consumers of the safety of food products, 
countries and companies have imposed more stringent food safety standards.  However, 
consumers are also called upon as the explanation for the increase in animal welfare standards 
and, more broadly, quality standards.  Quality standards, (i.e., organics, fair trade, animal 
welfare) as opposed to food safety standards (i.e., pesticides residues, contaminants), are 
processed based standards.  This means that the focus is on how the product is produced, with 
definitions of quality revolving around shared, socially constructed values (such as 
environmental conservation or regional characteristics) (Renard 2005).  Moreover, quality 
standards are voluntary standards, and it is argued that industry leaders adopt voluntary quality 
standards due to consumer demand, or at the very least, to allow retailers to differentiate 
products along lines that appeal to consumers, such as animal welfare, environmental 
sustainability, and worker welfare (Hatanaka, Bain, and Busch 2005).   
Yet, there are several aspects of animal welfare standards that challenge the notion that 
these standards are due solely to consumer demand.  First, animal welfare standards increase 
the cost of production, and thus most companies that adopt voluntary animal welfare standards 
would seemingly do so with the expectation that the consumer is willing to pay for the 
perceived quality content.2  For example, EU studies of the cost of production for chickens 
utilizing animal welfare standards in Europe have estimated increased costs in production from 
5 to 50 percent, depending upon the types of changes made, such as reduced stocking density, 
size of cage, and raising chickens outdoors (Moynagh 2000 citing EU Scientific Committee 
reports).  Yet, several studies of Western industrialized countries reveal that the number of 
consumers that are willing to pay more for improved animal welfare remains limited (see for 
example European Commission 2002; Mitchell 2001), and the more processed the product the 
less concerned consumers are about the issue (Moynagh 2000).  Another explanation for the 
adoption of animal welfare standards, which is also linked to consumer demand, is the idea that 
an organization needs to “maintain a positive image or at the very least avoid negative 
publicity” (Renard 2005: 420).  While there is certainly evidence to support this explanation, 
the consumer argument relies on the assumption that consumers purchase products that are 
aligned with their value systems.  Building on previous literature that has correctly pointed out 
that consumer values and actions are not always aligned (Swidler 1986; Wright 2005), this 
article argues that an understanding of consumer values and action is necessary, but insufficient 
to understand the responsiveness of organizations to agricultural animal welfare standards.  As 
such, this article will make use of neo-institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) to better 
                                                
2 A minimum level of animal welfare standards will actually reduce costs in animal production and processing, but 
most animal welfare standards being proposed today target a higher level of animal welfare than the minimum 
required by law (see Grandin 2001).   
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understand the rise of agricultural animal welfare standards, and more generally to provide a 
guide for recognizing the ways in which institutions shape the actions of organizations.  
 Neo-institutionalism is briefly elaborated on below, followed by a discussion of 
institutional isomorphism as described by DiMaggio and Powell (1991b).  Woven into the 
institutional isomorphism discussion is an analysis of agricultural animal welfare standards.  
Specifically, the World Animal Health Organization, private food retailers use of third party 
certification and corporate social responsibility reports, and the increasing emphasis placed on 
science of animal welfare will be discussed as it relates to agricultural animal welfare 
standards.  The conclusion elaborates upon the ways in which institutional isomorphism can 
provide a more robust understanding of the rise of agricultural animal welfare standards and 
provide a guide for future studies related to agricultural standards. 
Neo-Institutionalism 
Neo or the “new” institutionalism, as a theoretical framework, has been used in many 
diverse settings including, but not limited to economic works by Douglass North (1990) and 
Oliver Williamson (1985), economic sociologists (e.g. Fligstein 1996; Granovetter 1985; White 
1981), organizational theory (Scott 2001) and in historical comparative analyses (Evans 1995).  
Institutions are defined as intersecting social structures consisting of loosely bounded 
constellations of symbolic (i.e. codes, conventions, scripts) and material or behavioral (i.e. 
rituals, habits, practices) forms (Conrad 2006; Friedland and Alford 1991).  Neo-
institutionalists stress that while institutions provide structure to everyday life and guide human 
interaction, behavior of individuals and organizations must be explained on a situational basis, 
as behavior is deeply rooted in the cultural, political, and legal frames that the institutions are 
situated within (North 1990; Scott 2001).   
As with any theory, neo-institutionalism is not without its critics.  Specifically, 
sociological neo-institutionalism has been critiqued for reducing agency to enactment and 
neglecting power and group conflict (Colomy 1998).  Yet, several scholars have recognized the 
value of neo-institutionalism in sociology and have attempted to integrate and further the ideas 
of neo-institutionalism, for example Granovetter’s embeddedness (1985), Fligstein’s 
construction of a field (1996), and Barnett and Finnemore’s organizational analysis of global 
economic governance institutions (1999).  To date the use of sociological neo-institutionalism 
within agrifood studies has been limited, yet neo-institutionalism fits well with political 
economic agrifood studies.  While political economic perspectives provide the ability to 
recognize that economies are embedded in political and social relations, neo-institutionalism 
furthers our ability to appreciate the different ways in which institutions provide substantive 
guides for practical action.  Moreover, neo-institutionalism draws attention to the manner in 
which organizations are influenced by and imitate each other to promote success (Clemens and 
Cook 1999; Dobbin 1994; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Taplin 2006).   
 
A Neo-Institutionalist Analysis of Agricultural Animal Welfare Standards  
Any analysis of standards must begin with a brief discussion of The World Trade 
Organization (W.T.O.), as the operation of the WTO and its standard setting bodies have 
contributed to the importance placed upon standards in the agrifood system.  The World Trade 
Organization (W.T.O.) was created in 1995 as a permanent institution administering several 
international trade agreements and dealing with cases of international trade disputes (Spriggs 
and Isaac 2001).  The goal of the W.T.O. is to facilitate trade for producers of goods and 
services, importers, and exporters.  The creation of the W.T.O. effectively gave “more teeth” to 
trade dispute settlement procedures (Victor 2000).  Under the W.T.O. there are two agreements 
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that are most relevant to agriculture and food products, which are the Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT) and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreements.  The SPS agreement 
focuses explicitly on food safety issues, while the TBT agreement is broader in scope, 
pertaining to any internationally traded product.  The WTO’s SPS Agreement explicitly 
recognizes three international organizations (commonly referred to as the “three sister” 
organizations) that develop international standards, guidelines and recommendations for food 
and agriculture.  One of the three sister organizations, the World Animal Health Organization 
(OIE),3 develops standards for animal health.   
In 2005, the OIE officially adopted agricultural animal welfare guidelines, marking the 
first time a global governance organization has provided guidance on the issue. The guidelines 
focus on slaughter for human consumption, land and sea transport of animals, and humane 
euthanasia of animals for disease control purposes.  The significance of the OIE adopting 
animal welfare guidelines is linked to the fact that as one of the three sister organizations, the 
OIE serves as reference point for rulings in WTO dispute settlement cases.4  The moment the 
WTO identified the OIE as one of the three sister organizations was the moment in which the 
institutional arrangements of animal agriculture changed.   
For our purposes, the elevation of the OIE to international rule maker, is key in 
understanding the ways in which institutions complicate and constitute the paths by which 
solutions are sought (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a).  OIE provides an international forum for 
discussion and debate surrounding animal standards.  With the establishment of the OIE as one 
of the three sister organizations, all countries and organizations became more attuned to the 
dialogue occurring within the OIE.  For example, reporting on the first OIE global conference 
on animal welfare in Paris, France in February 2004, someone from a U.S. non-profit 
agricultural industry supported group writes: 
The three most important points to animal agriculture in the USA, 
and to many other countries outside the European Union, that arose 
from the meeting are: 
- The OIE will establish international guidelines for animal  
welfare starting with farm animals; 
- Confinement and transportation will be major issues; and, 
- Many expect the EU to use animal welfare as a factor in 
trade negotiations.  
If the World Trade Organization ultimately adopts the OIE's 
recommendations, the OIE guidelines will serve as the basis for 
international trade. Additionally the OIE anticipates its 
recommendations will lend support for developing relevant 
legislation in the countries that do not yet have animal welfare 
regulations. (Johnson 2004) 
Due to the position of the OIE in relation to the WTO, the potential power of animal welfare 
standards have been elevated within economic and government institutions.  The OIE creates 
an arena within which organizations and governments exchange ideas and experience conflict 
                                                
3 OIE was previously known as Office International des Epizooties. 
4 OIE standards and guidelines are not equal to national legislation, but rather are viewed as recommendations to 
national governments.  However, there is an advantage for countries that choose to adopt the OIE’s standards, 
guidelines and principles into national legislation.  Effectively, the standards promulgated by the three sister 
organizations provide a so-called “safe harbor” for countries.  Safe harbor refers to the idea that measures based 
on international standards, guidelines or recommendations developed by each of the three sister organizations are 
presumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement, and Members who base their measures on them can be 
confident of their compliance with the SPS Agreement.    
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over the topic of agricultural animal welfare, but more importantly, the interactions that occur 
in the OIE cement what DiMaggio and Powell (1991b: 65) refer to as an organizational field—
organizations in the aggregate that constitute a recognized area of institutional life (e.g., key 
suppliers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or 
products).5   
Recognizing an organizational field allows us to begin to understand the emergence of 
animal welfare standards across a wide range of organizations, as DiMaggio and Powell (Ibid) 
explain,  “once disparate organizations in the same line of business are structured into an actual 
field…powerful forces emerge that lead them to become more similar to one another.” This 
point can be made clear by examining Table 1 where it is notable that many of the agricultural 
animal welfare standards have emerged during the same ten-year period.  The rise of 
agricultural animal welfare standards can best be explained by DiMaggio and Powell’s concept 
of isomorphism — constraining processes that force one unit in a population to resemble other 
units that face the same set of environmental conditions.  Specifically, institutional 
isomorphism focuses on the fact that organizations compete not just for resources and 
customers, but also for political power and institutional legitimacy.   
DiMaggio and Powell further specify three mechanisms through which institutional 
isomorphic change occurs.  These three are coercive, mimetic, and normative.  Since all three 
can be seen within agrifood organizations, each mechanism will be discussed and directly 
related to animal welfare standards.  For our purposes each institutional isomorphic mechanism 
will be discussed as a discrete entity and linked to specific cases of agricultural animal welfare 
standards, however, in reality, these three mechanisms can, and often do, overlap.  
Coercive isomorphism stems from political influence and the problem of legitimacy.  This type 
of isomorphic mechanism results not only from both formal and informal pressures exerted on 
organization by other organizations upon which they are dependent, but also by cultural 
expectations in the society within which organizations function.  Within the agrifood context 
there are several examples of explicit imposition of organizational animal welfare standards on 
dependent organizations, the most notable of which involves Third Party Certification (TPC) of 
suppliers required by food retailers.  TPC and third–party certifiers are “private or public 
organizations responsible for accessing, evaluation, and certifying safety and quality claims 
based on a particular set of standards and compliance methods” set by agrifood organizations 
(Hatanaka, et al. 2005: 355, citing Deaton 2004).  The power of food retailers to set standards 
has increased in the past decade as the market share controlled by a few dominant retailers has 
increased.  For example between 1993 and 2000, the market share of the top five retailers in 
France increased from 48 to 61%, in Italy from 11 to 25% and in the U.S. from 20 to 40 % 
(Busch and Bain 2004).   
One of the more recent and well-known examples of a certification scheme is 
GLOBALGAP, which until recently was known as EurepGAP (Euro-Retailer Produce 
Working Group for Good Agricultural Practices).6  GLOBALGAP focuses on farm 
certification standards, with the intention of ensuring safe food that is produced respecting 
 
                                                
5 The process of institutional definition of fields is characterized by “an increase in the extent of interaction among 
organizations in the field; the emergences of sharply defined interorganizational structures of domination and 
patterns of coalition; an increase in the information load with which organizations in a field must contend; and the 
development of a mutual awareness among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a 
common enterprise” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 65). 
6 GLOBALGAP was announced as the new name of EurepGAP in September 2007. GLOBALGAP intends to 
reduce confusion and the number of audits required by streamlining the GAP standards required for producers.   
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Table 1: Examples of Private Sector, NGO, and Public Sector Agriculture Animal Welfare Policies and 
Guidelines 
Organization Position in Industry Year* Applied Region 
EurepGAP All the major European 
food retailers 
1997/2004 EU (Belgium, Finland, 
Germany, Netherlands, U.K.) & 
Switzerland 
Freedom Food - 
Labeling Scheme 
 1994 U.K. 
Certified Humane -  
Labeling Scheme 
 1998 United States (U.S.) 
Free Farmed - 
Certification & Labeling 
 2000 U.S. 
Private Sector  Year Applied Region 
Fast Food Chains (FFC)    
McDonald’s Largest FFC 1999 Global – locations that have 
McDonalds 
Burger King 2nd Largest Burger FFC 2001/2007 Global – locations that have BK 
KFC (a part of Yum! Brands) Largest chicken FFC 2003  
Wendy’s International 3rd Largest burger FFC  1998/2001  
Grocery Retailers     
Ahold 3rd Largest  2003 The Netherlands & subsidiaries 
in U.S. and Europe 
Kroger 4th Largest 2001 U.S.  
U.S. Packers    
Tyson Foods 1st for Beef & Chicken 2003 North America 
Cargill 2nd in Beef  2007 North America – notified an 
animal rights group phasing out 
sow gestation crates for the past 
four years. 
Smithfield Foods 1st in Pork 2003/2007 North America 2007 phase out 
gestation crates 
ConAgra Foods 3rd in Beef and Pork 
(co-owned Swift &Co.) 
2001 North America – adopted Food 
Marketing Institutes (FMI – an 
industry group) animal welfare 
guidelines; Developed in-house 
guidelines for Turkeys. 
International Organizations  Year Applied Region 
OIE  2005 Global 
Regional & National 
Governments 
 Year Applied Region 
European Union - 
Treaty of Amsterdam 
 1997 All EU members 
United Kingdom  
The Welfare of Farmed Animals 
 2000 U.K. 
Swedish Animal Welfare Act;  
Swedish Animal Welfare 
Ordinance 
 1988 Sweden  - the most stringent 
agricultural animal welfare 
regulations in the EU 
* If two years are listed, the second year signifies when the organization created stricter animal welfare 
standards. The year listed indicates the date of implementation of animal welfare standards, although 
some companies do not make implementation date available (e.g. Wendy’s International). 
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worker health, safety and welfare, environmental and animal welfare (EurepGAP.org).  The 
Euro Retailer Produce Working Group initiated EurepGAP in 1997.  Originally made up of a 
group of 13 of the largest European retailers including, Royal Ahold, Marks & Spencer, Tesco, 
Safeway, and Sainsbury, the mission of EurepGAP was to develop a harmonized standard for 
Good Agricultural Practices (GAP), together with a third party certification (TPC) system for 
the production of fresh fruit and vegetables.7  GLOBALGAP now has certification programs 
for three areas, one of which, the Integrated Farm Assurance, includes a sub area that engages 
with animal welfare for cattle and sheep, dairy, poultry, and pigs.  In the future, GLOBALGAP 
intends to expand their animal welfare guidelines, which will also expand to aquaculture.  
However, in the past several years NGO (non-governmental organization) groups lobbied 
EurepGAP/GLOBALGAP to slow their implementation of their standards arguing that too 
many small farmers, especially in developing countries, would be harmed by their inability to 
meet the stricter criteria required by EurepGAP retailers (see Graffham, Karehu, and 
Macgregor 2006).  In response EurepGAP agreed to slow the implementation of their required 
standards.  Beyond altruistic motives, it should be emphasized that if EurepGAP could not 
source enough products because so few producers met their standards, then the legitimacy of 
EurepGAP would be compromised.   
The above example of the implementation of TPC by a powerful retail organization is 
an example of coercive isomorphism in the form of organizations exerting formal pressure on 
other organizations.  National regulations that companies must comply with also represent 
coercive isomorphism.  However, in the case of animal welfare guidelines, most organizations’ 
animal welfare standards are more stringent than national regulations.  Yet, many companies 
acknowledge national regulations in their own animal welfare policies as a means of gaining 
legitimacy with national governments and the corresponding national public.  This is an 
example of coercive isomorphism occurring by way of cultural expectations.  Ultimately, there 
is a need for organizations to lodge managerial authority and responsibility, at least 
ceremonially, in a formally defined role in order to interact with other hierarchical 
organizations.  Evidence of this more cultural type of coercive isomorphism can be found in 
company Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports.  While there is no consistent 
definition of what is meant by CSR, they typically attempt to engage with the ‘triple bottom 
line’ of economic, social, and environmental performance (Busch et al. 2005; Maloni and 
Brown 2006).  Thus, private food retailers publish CSR reports as a way of informing 
stakeholders of the issues they are addressing beyond simply putting food on the supermarket 
shelf.  For example, Table 2 provides a comparison of the animal welfare sections of two major 
companies’ CSR reports (U.K. based Marks and Spencer and U.S. based Smithfield Foods). 
Both of the CSR reports make reference to national definitions of animal welfare.  In the case 
of Smithfield, reference is made to the U.S. Humane Methods of Slaughter Act 1978, while 
Marks & Spencer makes reference to the five freedoms (discussed further below) that 
emanated from the U.K. government appointed committee in 1979. 
As part of the creation of legitimacy within coercive isomorphism, TPC and CSR 
reports are often closely linked.  In order for a company to make claims about animal welfare 
within a CSR report, the company often carries out third party certification schemes to assure 
stakeholders (i.e., consumers, government officials, and other companies) that practices such as 
animal welfare are actually being followed within the food supply chain.  However, CSR 
reports do not require certification schemes, so the two initiatives do not have to be coupled. 
                                                
7 The Euro Retailer Produce Working Group agreed to work together to develop EurepGAP as a benchmark 
standard in order to avoid a situation where suppliers have to be separately certified for multiple retailers 
(USDA/FAS 2001).   
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Table 2. Excerpt from Corporate Social Responsibility Reports on Animal Welfare 
 
Company Corporate 
Headquarters  
Excerpt from Animal Welfare Policy/Principles 
Smithfield 
Foods, Inc. 
Virginia, USA Smithfield Foods, Inc. and all its subsidiaries involved with the 
production or processing of live animals are required to provide:  
• Comprehensive written animal welfare programs to ensure 
animal well-being.    
• Shelter that is designed, maintained and operated to provide a 
physical environment that meets the animals' needs.    
• Access to adequate water and high quality feed to meet animal 
nutrition requirements (production facilities) and in 
accordance with the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act 1978 
(processing facilities).  
• Humane treatment of animals which meets or exceeds the 
requirements of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 
1978, and all applicable American Meat Institute Animal 
Handling Guidelines (processing facilities).    
Marks & 
Spencer  
London, United 
Kingdom 
Marks & Spencer aims to ensure that wherever animals are used 
in the production of our products, their welfare is protected and 
that wild animal populations are used sustainably.  
Specifically for Marks & Spencer food products, it is our aim to 
ensure that all animals' welfare is protected by: 
• Working with farmers who share our attitude and approach to 
animal welfare. 
• Adopting the recommendations of the Farm Animal Welfare 
Council including ensuring that farming systems meet as 
many of the five freedoms* as possible. (*the five freedoms 
are; i. Freedom from hunger and thirst, ii. Freedom from 
discomfort, iii. Freedom to express normal behaviour, iv. 
Freedom from pain, injury and discomfort, v. Freedom from 
fear and distress) 
 
Mimetic isomorphism results from uncertainty within the environment in which 
organizations operate.  DiMaggio and Powell (1991b: 69) argue that organizations may model 
themselves on other organizations when organizational technologies are poorly understood, 
goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty.  Agriculture 
animal welfare standards provide one of the best examples of an uncertain environment, both in 
terms of not having an agreed upon definition of agricultural animal welfare, nor fully 
understanding the best techniques for ensuring adoption and compliance to animal welfare 
standards.   
As animal welfare standards have become part of a global conversation surrounding 
agriculture trade, there has been a greater emphasis on the sentience of animals and the science 
behind animal well-being.  Increasingly, within international organizations’ like the OIE and in 
regional and national legislation there is an understanding of animals as sentient beings, not 
solely as commodities to be owned and traded (Farve and Hall 2004).  The foundation of 
legally recognizing animals as sentient beings actually began almost thirty years earlier when 
Ruth Harrison published Animal Machines in 1964 in the U.K. (Wolfson 1996).  Due to 
Harrison’s work, the Brambell Committee, appointed by the British government, examined the 
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conditions in which livestock were kept within systems of intensive husbandry.  The committee 
was charged with assessing whether standards ought to be set in the interest of animal welfare.  
Emanating from the Brambell Committee were the five freedoms of animal welfare.  These 
five freedoms were to be considered for all agricultural animals regardless of their location in 
the industrial agricultural process (i.e., on the farm, in transit, or at the point of slaughter).  The 
five freedoms include: freedom from hunger and thirst, freedom from discomfort, freedom 
from pain, injury, disease, freedom to express normal behavior, freedom from fear and distress 
(Farm Animal Welfare Council 1979).  Although the five freedoms were never given the force 
of law (Wolfson 1996), the U.K., other European countries, and the EU relied heavily on the 
five freedoms in drafting animal welfare legislation over the past thirty years.    
The recognition of animals as sentient beings came to a peak when the EU signed the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 which recognized animals as sentient beings and required that 
animal welfare be considered when policies relating to agriculture, transport, and research are 
formulated or implemented by any of the EU member states (Hirsch 2003).  Despite a decade 
or more of animal welfare advocates fighting to redefine the status of animals within the EU, 
the Treaty of Amsterdam was the first EU document that not only recognized animals as 
sentient beings, but also made the treatment of animals legally binding.8  Today, despite the EU 
having passed the Treaty of Amsterdam there continues to be a tension between viewing 
agricultural animals as inputs to the food system versus as sentient beings that deserve equal 
protection under the law (refer to Miele, Murdoch, and Roe 2005 for an analysis of EU animal 
welfare regulation).  The shift in legal recognition of animals represents divergent paradigms 
regarding animal protection.  Generally, the animal rights perspective argues that humans 
should not dominate over animals, while the traditional welfare perspective does not counter 
human domination, but argues that humans should show concern for animals’ physical and 
emotional health (see Buller and Morris 2003; Francione 1996; Lubinski 2004 for more 
information). Animal welfare as an object of governing within agriculture is still in the process 
of clarification (Miele et al. 2005: 182).   
Correspondingly, there is considerable disagreement over the science of animal welfare 
and over the techniques that should be employed to ensure adequate welfare among agricultural 
animals.  Not coincidently, there is an emphasis on science within the WTO’s SPS and TBT 
Agreements.  The WTO cannot be credited with causing the increased focus on science in 
animal welfare discussions.  Rather the WTO is a part of a global trading system that promotes 
rationalization and efficiency and the appeal to scientific values like objectivity and 
transparency are one means to achieve these goals (Hatanaka et al. 2005).  In order to 
successfully reduce trade barriers, it is important that the WTO rely upon “objective measures” 
and not on cultural variables or other factors that would effectively limit trade.  For example 
the SPS Agreement specifically privileges trade rules based in science. Article 2, Paragraph 2 
under the SPS Agreement states: 
Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied 
only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, 
is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without 
sufficient scientific evidence, except as rovided for in paragraph 7 of 
Article 5.9 [emphasis added] (WTO SPS Agreement 1995) 
                                                
8 The Treaty of Rome (1957) created the European Economic Commission (EEC) and in the text of the Treaty 
animals are defined as agricultural goods.  Over the years many proposals were made, but none successfully, to 
change the way animals are defined in the Treaty of Rome (European Biomedical Research Association 1997). 
9 Article 5, paragraph 7: In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally 
adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, including that from the 
relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by other Members.  
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Despite the strong emphasis on scientific evidence, the science surrounding animal 
welfare remains inadequate.  Currently, the U.S. government uses health indicators (e.g., 
presence of illness) to measure animal well-being, whereas the EU government relies upon 
health, productivity, physiology, and ethology (e.g., comparison of animal behavior in an 
intensive farming situation with normal behavior) (Moynagh 2000).  Within the private sector 
there is also a fair amount of debate over animal welfare and best practices for producing 
animal welfare.  In the U.S. Temple Grandin, a prominent animal scientist and a major 
participant in constructing animal welfare standards for fast food restaurants, argues there are 
five key measurements inspectors need to follow in order to ensure animals receive humane 
treatment at slaughtering plants (Grandin 2005).  These include: accuracy of stunning animals, 
amount of vocalization by the animals prior to slaughter, insensibility and unconsciousness on 
the bleed rail, amount of electric prod use by staff, and the number of animals that trip or fall.  
However, there are many other actors within and outside the industry in the U.S. and in Europe 
that argue that there should be many more measures to be followed.  The infighting and 
contested terrain of animal welfare standards within an industry at the point of slaughter is 
symbolic of the types of arguments that occur in international trading arenas between countries, 
particularly when the conversation is expanded to include production techniques.  Among the 
issues debated for domesticated animals internationally include adequacy of space for the 
animals to move around and types and amount of feed the animals consume.  One group 
working on agricultural animal welfare is a diverse group of researchers working on a large EU 
funded project entitled “Welfare Quality Project.” One aim of the project is to develop a 
monitoring system for good farm animal welfare.  To this end, “there are more than 30 
researchers involved in this sub-project to ensure that the scheme has a good scientific basis” 
(Keeling n.d.).  However, the group notes that regardless of the scientific principles utilized, for 
a monitoring scheme to be widely accepted and implemented in practice, the scheme “has to 
satisfy public, industry and political views of animal welfare” (Ibid). 
Clearly, the practices of agricultural animal welfare remain contested.  This includes the 
uncertainty over consumer reaction and willingness to pay for more stringent animal welfare 
standards.  Thus, in situations of uncertainty, organizations tend to model themselves after 
similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or successful.  This 
can best be seen within the fast food retail sector where the number one fast food chain 
globally, McDonald’s, was the first to implement animal welfare standards and audits for all 
suppliers (Zwerdling 2002).  Shortly thereafter the other major fast food chains followed 
McDonald’s lead, including Wendy’s, KFC (formerly Kentucky Fried Chicken), and Burger 
King.  A similar trend can be seen among global grocery retailers and a less public shift in 
animal welfare standards among major U.S. pork, chicken and beef packers.  According to one 
industry group representative, many U.S. companies on the production side of animal 
agriculture have not publicized their shift in animal welfare policy in part due to the uncertainty 
of the types of animal welfare standards that will become the standard to follow and consumer 
willingness to pay extra for meat that comes from animals raised utilizing more stringent 
animal welfare standards (personal communication 2007, see for example Cargill in Table 1).   
This raises the point that there is also a ritual aspect to mimetic isomorphism, in that 
companies adopt these innovations to enhance their legitimacy.  The adoption of innovations 
may or may not reflect the actual work of the companies.  Meyer and Rowan (1991) note that 
conformity to institutionalized rules tends to contrast with efficiency criteria of an organization, 
yet institutionalized rules provide ceremonial conformity and legitimacy.  Animal welfare 
                                                                                                                                                     
In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly within a reasonable period of 
time. 
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standards can run counter to profit maximization and increased efficiency of livestock 
production facilities (i.e., the increased costs of production and consumer unwillingness to pay 
for such standards).  From the very earliest days of industrialization, techniques for meat 
production and slaughtering were developed based on ideas of factory production.  In other 
words, an assembly line process with a greater division of labor that increased efficiency 
served as an ideal model of how to advance the agricultural industry, and farm animals became 
sites for capitalist accumulation through processes of selection, breeding, and intensive 
husbandry (Buller and Morris 2003).  The technologies and methods used in meat production 
reflected industrial societies’ interest in increasing control of animals and humans (Burt 2006).  
Due to the success of an assembly line approach to meat production, Western industrialized 
societies are able to raise and slaughter animals on a scale not previously imaginable.  For 
example in the United States, it is common in large slaughterhouses for 300 cattle an hour to be 
slaughtered, with the rate of cattle killed every twenty-four hours in the U.S. around 100,000 
(Burt 2006).  The size of the slaughter facility is often criticized as it relates to animal welfare 
due to the large number of animals that: are held in holding pens, are exposed to extreme 
temperatures in holding areas, and experience elevated stress levels due to transportation and 
handling of animals upon arrival at the slaughter facilities. 
Table 3 displays the overall increase in the quantity of live animals exported globally in 
the past thirty years.10  Live animal trade is highlighted because trade in live animals represents 
the proverbial tip of the iceberg, as companies prefer to move meat in processed form. 11   Thus 
the increase in live animal trade over the past thirty years is reflective of the overall increase in 
consumption of meat products globally.  Consumption rates reveal that the developed world 
(Western, industrialized countries) will increase meat consumption from eighty-eight million 
metric tons in 1988 to a projected one-hundred and fifteen million metric tons by 2020, while 
the developing world is estimated to more than triple their meat consumption from fifty million 
metric tons in 1983 to a projected one-hundred and eighty-eight million metric tons in 2020 
(Delgado et al. 1999).12  In addition, live animal trade represents one of the more inhumane 
practices in animal agricultural production.  Live agricultural trade usually involves long 
shipment periods in which animals, usually onboard cargo ships, are exposed to overcrowded 
confinement (where animal diseases more easily spread), poor ventilation, and extreme 
temperatures (Millstone and Lang 2003; Wright and Muzzatti 2007).13  Thus, viewing 
agriculture animal welfare standards within a broader political economic perspective can 
enable us to better understand the neo-institutionalist point that rules can provide ceremonial 
conformity and legitimacy, but have the potential to not actually reflect the demands of the 
work environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a; Meyer and Rowan 1991).  
Finally, normative isomorphism is the pressure brought about by professions.  Formal 
education and legitimation in university specialists and the growth and elaboration of 
professional networks that span several organizations are two aspects of professionalization 
that are important to normative isomorphism.  Historically, university specialists (particularly 
animal scientists) have played a significant role in shaping the lives of agricultural animals. 
The history of university specialists’ engagement with animals and animal welfare is grim.  
                                                
10 The Europeans are seen as more agricultural animal welfare friendly, yet approximately two million live pigs, 
cattle, sheep and horses are transported around Europe annually.  For example, approximately 1.5 million pigs are 
exported annually from the Netherlands to Italy and Spain for slaughter or further fattening, due partially to the 
strict anti-pollution laws in the Netherlands (see Millstone and Lang 2003). 
11 It takes four times as many resources to transport live animals than to transport meat (Millstone and Lang 2003). 
12 In developing countries, population growth, urbanization and income growth are identified as key factors that 
have contributed to the major increase in demand for food of animal origin (Delgado et al. 1999).   
13 In the 1990s several cargo ships carrying live animals caught fire and sunk killing anywhere from 40,000 to 
70,000 sheep each time (see Wright and Muzzatti 2007). 
Ransom – Vol. 15(3), December 2007 
 
 
 
37 ISSN: 0798-1759 
Within sociological texts animals have largely remained invisible and the interactions between 
humans and animals ignored (Tovey 2003).  More broadly within the natural sciences, animals 
have been seen as inferior and separate from human activities and human qualities, such as the 
capacity to have emotions (Haraway 1989; 1991; Ritvo 1987; Siebert 2006).  While there have 
long been critics of animal treatment within agriculture, most critics have been situated outside 
the university (e.g., NGOs).  Being situated outside the university means that claims made by 
animal welfare activists are often ignored as illegitimate sources of knowledge (refer to 
Harding 1991 for an elaboration of what counts as legitimate knowledge).   
 
Table 3. Thirty Years of Live Animal Export  
Live Animal Export Quantity ( tons)
22,010,890
35,654,959
49,171,434 49,916,940
1974 1984 1994 2004
 
Source: FAO Statistics Division 2007 
 
However, in recent years the knowledge surrounding the science and technology of 
animal welfare has become contested terrain.  People and organizations that are situated within 
university settings and professional networks will continue to be the primary definers of what 
is considered legitimate knowledge surrounding animal welfare.  Yet, due in part to the 
elevation in the importance of the OIE, and, therefore, the creation of an organizational field 
(organizations in the aggregate that constitute a recognized area of institutional life) around 
animal agriculture, the conversation surrounding animal welfare has shifted.  Beginning in the 
1990s university courses focused on animal welfare and animal rights began being offered 
across many different disciplines.  One can now find courses focused on animal welfare/well-
being, animal rights, and animal sentience in over forty states in the U.S., in addition to courses 
offered in Canada and Spain (CRLE 2007).  Furthermore, the shift to focusing on animal 
sentience (as opposed to animal behavior) among professional animal scientists will continue 
to reshape the way agricultural animal welfare is discussed (CIWF 2006).  In addition, there is 
new grant funding available nationally and regionally to support academic research on 
agricultural animal welfare standards (e.g. the EU funded project “Animal Welfare Quality”).  
Finally, the formation of an organizational field facilitates the ability of a variety of 
organizations, not only university specialists, but also NGO personnel, to enter into a 
conversation about agricultural animal welfare standards.  Of the three types of isomorphism, 
normative isomorphism makes up the smallest component of a neo-institutionalist analysis of 
agricultural animal welfare standards and yet, has the potential to redefine the conventions and 
practices surrounding animal agriculture. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
According to DiMaggio and Powell, for all three types of isomorphic mechanisms, 
isomorphism will proceed even if there is an absence of evidence that it increases internal 
organizational efficiency.  While some voluntary agricultural animal welfare standards can 
work well within the model of efficiency that much of the Western industrialized farming 
world relies upon, there are many other animal welfare standards that do increase costs of 
production (e.g., size of holding pens, use of anesthetic during castration or dehorning), with no 
assurance that organizations or individuals will receive a premium for their product (e.g., see 
Moynagh 2000).  If it is understood that organizations are often rewarded for their similarity to 
other organizations in their fields because it becomes “easier for organizations to transact with 
other organizations, to attract … staff, to be acknowledged as legitimate and reputable, to fit 
into administrative categories that define eligibility for public and private grants and contracts,” 
all of which are important rewards for any organization (1991b: 73), then we begin to 
understand why so many organizations have adopted agricultural animal welfare standards in 
recent years. 
Thus, utilizing a sociological neo-institutional perspective provides a framework for 
more fully understanding the rise of agricultural animal welfare standards.  While consumer 
demand is a factor in the rise of agricultural animal welfare standards, there are other factors at 
work within the agrifood system. Moreover, neo-institutionalism allows us to recognize the 
ways in which institutions define the solutions to agricultural animal welfare.  Neo-
institutionalism also signals to scholars that some solutions are forgone because they are not 
even in the realm of possibility within the current institutional framework and organizational 
fields.  Indeed this article has outlined some of the organizations that have adopted animal 
welfare standards for food animals, but future analyses could focus on the ways in which 
institutions shaped the discourse and practices of agricultural animal welfare standards within 
these organizations.  Such an approach would further an analysis of the ways in which 
particular practices dominate at the expense of other types of practices within organizations.  
An analysis of this sort would also allow for an examination of the discourse and practices that 
are so central to the maintenance and legitimacy of institutions that they remain unchallenged 
at the public level (Conrad 2006). 
 A neo-institutional analysis highlights the distinction that should be made between the 
formal structure of an organization and its actual day-to-day activities (Meyer and Rowan 
1991: 42).  Thus, while there are several scholars researching the certification (TPC) programs 
being implemented by private retailers, it appears important to continue to revisit the on-going 
practice of agricultural animal welfare standards (and other quality/process standards), not 
simply the initial implementation of the standards.  As neo-institutionalism suggests the 
organizational form has the potential to take precedence over the content.  This seems 
especially important as it is likely a growing proportion of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures within the World Trade Organization will be focused on process standards 
(e.g., animal welfare or other production techniques), which as highlighted earlier are much 
harder to observe and measure in the final end product (Unnevehr and Roberts 2004). 
Ultimately, acknowledging institutional isomorphism is useful for understanding the politics 
and ceremony that pervade much of our modern organizational life. 
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